15 December 2005

INSIGHT FROM THE BAD GUYS

This is part of a transcript made available by the The Jamestown Foundation, a policy advocate group specifying in Middle East, Asia and terrorism (www.jamestown.org)

The foundation's information outlet is the "Terrorism Monitor." Editor of TM, Mahan Abedin, conducted this interview with Saad al-Faqih, a Saudi opposition leader on December 12, 2005 in London. This is one excerpt of a fairly lengthy interview that covers Afghanistan,Iraq, Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda politics and tactics and more.

MA: What is the most striking feature about the letter? [A letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.]

SF: I think it shows that al-Qaeda secretly thinks it might have made a mistake by appointing Zarqawi as its leading representative in Iraq. Zarqawi is far too decisive as a commander, and this is what drives his arrogance. Some people say there are many people in the jihadi circles who are trying to reach bin Laden in order to convince him to remove Zarqawi as the local al-Qaeda commander in Iraq. The jihadi leaders in Iraq have largely kept silent but they are not at all happy with Zarqawi's conduct. One of their biggest criticisms is on Zarqawi's decision to stay and fight in Fallujah once the Americans decided to attack the town in November 2004. The other jihadi leaders wanted to avoid a direct large-scale confrontation with American forces and instead concentrate on exhausting them through a war of attrition. At that time the other jihadi leaders not only avoided criticizing Zarqawi but in fact decided to stay with his forces and fight the massive U.S. Marines assault on the town.

MA: Are there any other striking features about the letter?

SF: It indicates that Zawahiri remains al-Qaeda's main strategist and that his understanding of the battle space and how it will evolve in the immediate future surpasses that of any other strategist, whether jihadi or American.

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